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ARCTIC SHIPPING ROUTES 
Especially Northern Sea Route 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2013 – Vagn Riis 
"Only when ice breaks 
Will you truly know who your friend is 
And who your enemy is." 
Inuit proverb 
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Abstract 
This research investigates the possibilities of new Arctic Shipping Routes that are possible because of the 
changing Arctic environment, from a global political economy perspective. At first, looking at the 
relationship between globalization and shipping. Using concepts from the newest form of Global Value 
Chain Theory and transportation geography, the opportunities and uncertainties of shipping in the Arctic 
Ocean is analyzed. The results of the project is that at present, only the Northern Sea Route, which follows 
the northern Russian coastline that is the only viable route through the Arctic Ocean. Today, most of this 
route are during the Russian security and control, which is a clear barrier to the use and exploitation of the 
Northern Sea Route as a transit route. The route is now navigable approx. half of the year. In 2009, the first 
international sailing vessel was sailing on the route and since then 155 ships passed the route. 
Nevertheless, this number is minimal compared to the total global sea transport. Although there have been 
and occurs notable developments along the Northern Sea Route, I have not seen a significantly in changed 
transportation patterns and in the global political economy yet. 
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1. Acronyms: 
AC Arctic Council 
AO Arctic Ocean 
CAA Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration 
COSCO China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 
CO2 Carbon dioxide 
DI Confederation of Danish Industries 
GVC Global Value Chains 
GCC Global Commodity Chain 
GPN Global Production Network Committee 
IASC International Arctic Science  
IMO International Maritime Organization 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas  
MA Main question 
MT Metric Tonnes 
NBC Nordic Bulk Carries 
NEP Northeast Passage 
NSIDC National Snow and Ice Data Center 
NSR Northern Sea Route 
NWP Northwest Passage 
NEA North-East Atlantic 
PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
RMQ Reply Main Question 
RSQ Reply Sub Question 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea (IMO) 
SQ Sub Question 
STCW Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 
ULCC Ultra Large Crude Carrier 
US Unites States of America 
USGS United States Geological Survey 
VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier  
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2. Introduction   
2.1 Problem Area  
The Arctic region seems to be in constant transformation, (geo) politically, economically, culturally and 
indeed geologically and environmentally. However, as we continue to witness significant changes across 
the Arctic, it is important to remember those political processes and forces in which the events, issues and 
debates of the region have been evolving over the last decades.  
This perspective does not always take into account earlier legacies, such as colonialism and a capitalist 
world-economy, which tied the Arctic region into the resource needs of European imperial powers 
(Wallenstein, 1987). 
One of the most significant global issues over the past 10 years, the large changes in the Arctic region, has 
again turned the world’s attention to the Arctic. 
The Arctic ice barrier is melting away due to anthropogenic global warming (Knecht & Kiel 2013: 178). 
Those environmental changes in the region are creating new opportunities and challenges, not only for the 
Arctic states, but also for the broader international community. 
 The Arctic is rapidly emerging as a geostrategic flash point, because the region is home to a wide range of 
fossil fuels, minerals, metals and other valuable natural resources. These resources could become 
accessible to world-markets if the ice continues to retreat.  
The Arctic covers an area of about 14.5 million km2 of which some parts are currently outside existing 
territorial boundaries. However, the Arctic states (Canada, Russia, Norway, the United States and Denmark) 
are all working to extend their territorial rights in the North. 
Warming in the Arctic is happening faster than anywhere else on the planet, and the average temperature 
in the Arctic has in the first decade of the 21st century surpassed all previous measurements. Sea ice has 
been shrinking, and melting of the Greenland ice sheet and other Arctic ice caps will contribute more and 
more to global sea level rise. 
2.1.2 Sea ice is melting around Greenland: 
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All data is from September where the Arctic sea ice normally reaches its annual minimum extent. The map 
shows the spread of the sea ice from September 1980 until September 2012.                                             
Source: National Snow & Ice Data Center. 
According to a widely circulated 2008 report by the US Energy Resources Program, the Arctic may hold 90 
billion barrels of oil and 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas; respectively 13 percent and 30 percent of the 
world´s estimated undiscovered reserves (US Geological Survey 2008). The melting of the ice in the Arctic 
Ocean will not only give access to untapped energy and mineral resources, 
The melting of ice in the Arctic Ocean will not only provide access to untapped energy and mineral 
resources, it also provides shipping many more options and makes it less complicated to operate. The 
receding ice has led to increased interest from several companies that are looking to find a shorter route to 
the northern hemisphere. This development would have an enormous impact on global trade. Arctic sea-
lanes could be tremendous cost savers, as they are much shorter than existing routes (Rainwater 2012: 70).  
The potential opening of Arctic shipping routes could be analyzed in terms of international relations, States 
forces, the area's dynamics and consequences for wildlife. The complexity of these different areas creates a 
need to narrow the focus of the analysis. Therefore, I will focus this project, among many other relevant 
options on shipping and the use of transit routes in the Arctic Ocean. 
2.2 Globalization and Shipping 
Shipping has been an important human activity throughout history. 
1. Transportation, one of the four cornerstones of globalization, along with 
2.  Communications,  
3.  International standardization and 
 4. Trade liberalization                                                                                                                                                                                            
(Kumar and Hoffman 2002).  
Improvements in transport technologies have made major contribution to the rapid circulation of capital in 
its physical forms – as raw materials, machinery, labor power, and outputs of finished products (Stilwell 
2006: 133).  
In earlier generations of the industrial revolution, a key infrastructural driver of globalization was the 
reduction in shipping costs (Kaplinsky 2005: 77). Larger freighters and container ships have made significant 
contributions to capitalist development (Stilwell 2006: 133).  
There is a symbiotic relationship between globalization and maritime shipping. Globalization has increased 
the demand for maritime shipping, while maritime shipping (as an integrated component in a larger goods 
movement system) has more fully enabled globalization (Corbett and Winebrake 2008: 4). The declining 
costs of shipping in the past 150 years have facilitated a massive expansion trade in goods (Levy 2005: 687).   
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According to the Economist’s special report in the Arctic, there has been a big increase in Arctic shipping in 
recent years: “A 2009 assessment by the Arctic Council counted 6,000 vessels in the Arctic, mostly fishing 
trawlers and mining barges in the lower reaches.  
However, the traffic that has everyone excited is using the Arctic to shorten the journey between 
continents. Almost all of it is taking the Northern Sea Route; the same applies to Russian and Chinese 
shipping!  
The 34 vessels that traversed it last year shipped 820,000 Tonnes of cargo; official Russian forecasts suggest 
that this year's figure will be 1.5m Tonnes. By 2020, according to American estimates, that will rise to 64m 
Tonnes” (The Economist 2012).  
2.3 Problem Statement 
What I want to clarify is the status of where we are right now with Arctic Shipping Routes! The available 
material that I have gone through the counter part of the Arctic Shipping Routes will be a number of years 
and what it offers opportunities and challenges. Therefore, I have formulated the following main issues:   
“How do new maritime Shipping/trading routes in the Arctic region impact global trade?” 
3. Methodology     
3.1 Research design     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
In this project, I have used the extensive amount of academic literature on Arctic politics and 
economics, See theory later. 
 3.1.1 Shipping professional                                                                                                                                                                                       
I have also conducted interviews, E- mailings and telephone communication with shipping professionals:  
Peter Bay Kirkegaard – Confederation of Danish Industries 
Mads Boye Petersen – Nordic Bulk Carries  
3.2 Conference in Copenhagen 25 November 2013 
From the Conference held in Copenhagen 25 November 2013 by Danish Ship-owners Association, key notes 
speakers: (Partly together with group 1) 
 Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Commandant, Royal Danish Defense College.  
 Ambassador Damien Miller, Australian Ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway and 
Iceland. 
 Ambassador Sturla Sigurjònsson, Icelandic Ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark. 
“The NSR is not particularly suitable for container shipping. Container traffic means commitment to a fixed 
schedule. There are too many commercial problems in using this uncertain route. Maersk for example will 
not be involved. Their policy is to invest in giant vessels, which can now not be used in the Arctic because 
they do not have the right port-facilities, now! 
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 Container shipping plays a vital role in global trade; it is the main reason why we now talk about the global 
world. Containerization has made transportation incredibly inexpensive. The transportation costs of 
commodities are very low. Lower transportation costs will not influence commodity prices; they could only 
give the shipping companies higher profits. Shipping has facilitated that the choice of location for 
international businesses is no longer directly dependent on transportation costs.” 
The speed of transport does not matter for producers; it is all about on-time and on-demand deliveries. 
When you look at maritime shipping, container shipping only plays a small role: 
 Fifteen percent of the total amount that is being shipped.  
Five commodities (1.iron. 2. Ore, 3. Coal, 4. Grain, 5. Oil and oil products) 
 Constitute 75 percent of the volume of maritime transportation. Whatever happens in these 5 sectors is 
defining what happens within the shipping business.” 
Notes and conclusions from the Arctic Conference held in Copenhagen 25 November 2013 by Danish Ship-
owners Association, from the key notes speakers:  
Rear Admiral Nils Wang, Commandant, Royal Danish Defense College 
Ambassador Damien Miller, Australian Ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway and Iceland 
Ambassador Sturla Sigurjònsson, Icelandic Ambassador to the Kingdom of Denmark. 
3.3 Interview for informal elite (expert) 
3.3.1 Interview with Tor Wergeland - Together with group 1                                                                                                      
The interview form used in this project has been categorized as a qualitative expert or elite interview, where 
we as researchers strive to acquire relevant knowledge on the research topic at hand from an expert on the 
field (Brinkmann and Kvale 2009: 167). We contacted Tor Wergeland, who has worked in the shipping 
industry, but also taught and researched at numerous academic institutions on shipping economics. His 
experience and in-depth knowledge on the topic makes him highly suitable for an expert interview, but also 
made it very important for us as researchers to be well prepared (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008: 167). He has 
partially established his expertise by being a member and editor of the International Association of 
Maritime Economist (IAME) and their newsletter. Furthermore, he was recently part of a research group 
that has published a comprehensive book on Shipping in Arctic Waters (Østreng et al. 2010).  
Tor Wergeland is the only expert that has been interviewed for our project, which presents some additional 
practical and ethical considerations to his role in our research. Therefore it is essential that we address his 
potential biases and explain the subjective position from which he is articulating and interpreting his views. 
During the interview, it was evident that Wergeland’s expert considerations were influenced by his work 
experiences with Arctic shipping. In particular, his experiences with Russian authorities and companies in the 
1990s have made him very skeptical about working with Russians again. This clearly influences his 
statements in the interview, but he made no attempts during the interview to hide this, and he is one of very 
few people in Denmark with these insights. Therefore, we do not consider his statements as void or 
insupportable, but we have on the other hand been very careful not to put too much emphasis on his 
statements in relation to Russian activity in the Arctic region.  
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3.3.2 The Interview and a Semi-structured Guide  
The interview with Tor Wergeland was performed on 20 November, and carried out in his personal gallery in 
inner Copenhagen. The group followed a flexible and semi-structured interview guide, which included a set 
of questions and topics that should be covered during the interview (Bryman 2008: 438). This approach gave 
leeway for additional questions to be raised, and the guide was not followed in the particular order as 
described in appendix.1.  
 
3.4 Other data                                                                                                                                                                                                   
In order to get a different approach other than a private sector one I have incorporate information and 
analysis made by official institutions. Here, as an example, The Arctic Council is on use. Not only have it 
provide me with information on how the nations who borders the Arctic is responding to the possibilities, 
but they also have an organisation which is monitoring the activity in regards to the Arctic environment. 
3.5 Research question  
3.5.1 Main question:  
How do new maritime Shipping/trading routes in the Arctic region impact global trade? 
3.5.2 Sub-questions (research questions) 
 
1. Who are the principal stakeholders in maritime transportation in the Arctic?  
2. Which maritime activities have been taking place on the Northern Sea Route, by whom and what is 
their motivation? 
4. Theory   
4.1 Global Political Economy Theory  
International Political Economy scholars are concerned with questions such as “Has globalized capitalism 
overcome the nation-state?” and “Are capitalist states becoming obsolete?” The orthodox neoclassical 
economists would argue that we are facing the end of geopolitics. Globalization is breaking down the 
territorial boundaries. The economic integration of nations leads to greater social and cultural integration. 
Contemporary Marxist scholars and neo-realists disagree with the notion that globalized capitalism has 
overcome the nation-state. Callinicos, for example, states that significant economic and political conflicts 
persist among the main capitalist states (Callinicos, 2007: 533).  
4.2 Global Value Chain Analysis                                                                                                                  
Within the research project, we have made use of the literature on global value chain (GVC) analysis. This 
approach first appeared in the literature under the term global commodity chain (GCC) analysis. Both 
Hopkins and Wallerstein used this notion of a commodity chain as “a network of labor and production 
processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (Hopkins 1986, Wallerstein 1994).  
The beginning of global commodity chain analysis as a relatively coherent paradigm can be traced to a 
collection edited by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994). They focus on the emergence of a new global 
manufacturing system in which economic integration goes beyond international trade in raw materials and 
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final products, to encompass centrally coordinated but internationally dispersed production of many of the 
activities along the chains of given commodities of manufactured products (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 75).  
In recent years, the global commodity chain literature has abandoned the term commodity chain; the term 
value chain has replaced it. The latter is thought to better capture a wider variety of products, some of 
which lack commodity features. The concept of a value chain emphasizes the interconnected and 
sequential nature of economic activity in which each link adds value in the process (Gibbon and Ponte 
2005: 77). 
“And then - why! ”                                                                                                                                                                    
Within modern political economy, the concept is not used to analyze a specific firm or country. Instead, it 
highlights the relative value of those activities that are required to bring a product or service from 
conception through the different phases of production, delivery to final consumers and final disposal after 
use (Gereffi et. al. 2001: 3). There are ranges of activities within each link of the chain. For the chain of 
production, this includes activities such as inward logistics, transforming, inputs and packaging (Kaplinsky 
2005: 101). 
A lot of progress has been made since the early 1990s in theorizing governance and upgrading in GVCs, but 
more remains to be achieved (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 94). Gibbon and Ponte claim that GVC analysts have 
not yet formulated a coherent theoretical framework with significant explanatory power. 
4.3 Infrastructure within the Global Political Economy                                                              
Several scholars have addressed the role that infrastructure plays within global trade. The reaping of 
competitive advantage by individual firms or by groups of firms is significantly affected by the availability of 
suitable infrastructure (Kaplinsky 2005: 76). Transport became a primary infrastructural input during the 
Industrial Revolution. Adam Smith observed that the division of labor, which provided scope for substantial 
productivity improvements, was limited by the extent of the market.  
Producers who had the ability to penetrate distant markets therefore found themselves at an increasing 
competitive advantage. Therefore, from the onset of the industrial revolution, there has been a strong link 
between corporate growth and profitability and the physical infrastructure that has provided access to 
markets (Kaplinsky 2005: 76).  
Many infrastructural services are public goods, that is, access cannot be restricted and in general, they are 
not used up in the process of consumption (Kaplinsky 2005: 77). For this reason, they are generally difficult 
to appropriate.  
4.4 Off shoring in the New Global Political Economy – Not Outsourcing! 
Economists and management scholar’s claims that ‘off shoring’ is simply another form of trade with mutual 
benefits. Some argue that reducing wages through off shoring leads to wealth creation for shareholders but 
not necessarily for countries and employees, and that many displaced workers have difficulty ‘trading up’ 
to higher skilled jobs. Off shoring is a new phenomenon that entails the organizational and technological 
ability to relocate specific tasks and coordinate a geographically dispersed network of activities. It 
decouples the linkages between economic value creation and geographic location. The result is the creation 
of global commodity markets for particular skills and a shift in the balance of market power among firms, 
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workers, and countries. Levy (2005) Journal of Management Studies, Volume 42, Issue 3, pages 685–
693, May 2005 
4.5 The Three Dimensions of Globalization                                                                                              
Scholars identify three dimensions of globalization and the structure of the global economy (Angel et. al. 
2007: 298) foreign direct investment, international trade and global networks of firms as vehicles for 
production, trade, and investment. Angel et. Al. state that the structure of the global economy has changed 
profoundly over the past three decades, especially due to the dramatic increases in foreign direct 
investment and international trade. Furthermore, they emphasize the current importance of global 
production networks of firms as vehicles for industrial production, trade and investment.  
 It is interesting to discover these three dimensions of globalization within the phenomenon of maritime 
shipping. The first, foreign direct investment is a hallmark of maritime transport with regard to fleet 
registry, ownership and crewing trends (Corbett and Winebrake 2008: 24). The second dimension, 
international trade, can be seen as the defining business of global shipping. In addition, global shipping 
firms are at least described within the third dimension, global networks of firms. Corbett and Winebrake 
(2008) even state that containerization especially is promoting the vertical integration in international 
logistics.  
5. Analysis 
5.1 Arctic Shipping Route
Source: Arctic shipping routes, DI´s Global benchmark report 2013  
5.2 New shipping routes                                                                                                                            
New shipping routes are gradually opening up as the sea ice in the Arctic region retreats. This will 
significantly reduce sailing times between Asia and Europe/America. Since 90 per cent of international 
trade is shipped by sea, new, shorter shipping routes will have an enormous impact on global trade. 
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With the Arctic shipping routes, the shipping industry will be able to reduce its exposure to many of the 
challenges it is faced with today. These include bottlenecks in congested waters around the Suez Canal, the 
Panama Canal and the Strait of Malacca, and the safety problems related to piracy.  
On the other hand, new challenges appear in relation to crews and equipment that must be able to deal 
with harsh weather conditions and drifting icebergs – even in the summer.  
 
 
The Arctic region offers three shipping routes: 
>> The North East Passage north of Russia between Europe and Asia/West America (NSR) 
>> The North West Passage north of Canada between East America and Asia/West America 
>> The Central Arctic shipping route across the North Pole that gives access to Europe and 
 East America from Asia/West America. 
The North East Passage (NSR) is already navigable for 4-5 months during the summer. In September 2010, a 
cargo ship from the Danish shipping company Nordic Bulk Carriers completed the first ever-commercial 
passage through the North East Passage to China. The cargo was 41,000 tons of iron ore, and compared 
with passage through the Suez Canal, sailing time was just one third. The shipping company saved USD 
180,000 in fuel costs and a corresponding amount of CO2. Since then, Nordic Bulk Carriers has increased 
their activities along this route, and in 2012, the company completed 46 voyages, accounting for 75 per 
cent of all voyages through the North East Passage.  
The North East Passage is particularly interesting from a European perspective. A trip from Rotterdam to 
Yokohama north of Russia is only at 8,500 km, or 12,000 km shorter than through the Suez Canal. The trip 
from Rotterdam to Vancouver north of Russia is 12,500 km, or 3,500 km shorter than through the Panama 
Canal.  
The North West Passage is open for shipping roughly every seven summers, but is expected to be navigable 
every second summer from 2050. The route across the Arctic Ocean is not yet open for shipping, but 
navigability is expected to increase gradually so that by 2050 the area in and around will be open during 
four months of the summer.  
5.2.1 Northwest Passage.                                                                                                                                                   
There is also a Northwest Passage through the Canadian Arctic islands (Kao et al., 2011, 835). This route can 
potentially connect Northeast Asia to the eastern North American coast (Ibid).  
What is relevant is that shipping will also be developed on the other side of the Arctic, and can help to 
make the region the primary link between North America, Northern Europe and Northeast Asia. It is here, 
perhaps the most considerable gain, a gain that can be said to be equal for all the member states of the 
Arctic Council. The Arctic Council wants to be a key international player and frame imaging plays in such a 
transport route.  
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5.2.2 Commercialization of the NSR.                                                                                                                       
The decline of the Arctic sea ice and the changes in the political environment enable the possible opening 
and commercialization of the NSR for transits. From 1979 to 2006 the length of the ice-free season in all 
seas and straits in the Russian Arctic increased in average from 84 to 129 days (Rodrigues, 2008).  
Near real-time sea ice, monitoring and operational forecasting is available (Johannessen et al., 1996). Verny 
and Grigentin (2009) impart predictions of a navigable Arctic Ocean all year-round in year 2015, including 
the Russian Arctic coast. Establishing the NSR as an alternative shipping route to Suez and Cape of Good 
Hope, could contribute to more flexible, agile and adaptable supply chains, because more route choices will 
result in a higher capacity, and may reduce chances for disruption and congestion. 
The volume of maritime transport has really grown in recent decades, whilst the cost has gone down. 
 
 
The Figure gives an overview of the significant shorter route from the UK to South Korea. The red route 
marks the classic via the Suez Canal, while the blue route marks the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic - 
Source: Wikipedia. 
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5.2.3 Ice-free Arctic                                                                                                                                      
The ice-free Arctic will increase the shipping traffic from Asia to Europe and it will grow strongly this year. 
When the 19,000-tonne Chinese container ship 'Yong Sheng' arrived in Rotterdam, was written a new 
chapter in the history of an increasingly ice-free Arctic. It was the first time a large container vessel sailed 
from Asia to Europe by the Northeast Passage. 'Yong Sheng's' journey from Dalian in China to Rotterdam 
Netherlands - north of Russia - took only 35 days. 
Was the ship sailed south around Asia via the Suez Canal would journey will have been 14 days 
longer. Therefore, both times a fuel on the journey has been great savings. The first successful Chinese 
sailing the Northeast Passage with a freighter also marks the major Asian carriers increasingly even begin to 
take an interest in the new quick route to Europe. 'Yong Sheng' belonging to the state-owned COSCO, 
which has the world's sixth largest fleet of container ships. 
5.2.4 Europe Relieves. 
New shipping routes will have major significance for Europe Relieves present problems but raises new 
challenges The North East Passage is already navigable Arctic routes involve major savings Navigability 
increases towards 2050 Major requirements on crews and equipment. 
Source: DI´s Global benchmark report 2013  
5.2.5 Profit sharing. 
New sailing routes profit sharing, Search, and Rescue. The search for a shorter sea route from the Atlantic 
to Asia since the 16th century was a priority of maritime nations (Kao et al., 2011, 835). It still melting ice 
may make the Arctic sea route to a functional reality (ibid.). This refers primarily to the Northeast Passage 
that the passage from the Atlantic over Scandinavia and Russia to Asia. The navigation distance via the 
Northern Sea Route (NSR) from a Northwest-European port to the Far East Is, approximately 40% shorter 
compared to the route via the Suez Canal.  
The shorter distance may facilitate more than a doubling of vessels’ operational energy efficiency 
performance. There is at present substantial uncertainty in schedule reliability via the NSR. Unless the 
schedule reliability is improved, the NSR should primarily be explored for bulk rather than for liner shipping. 
A major disadvantage with The NSR is its seasonality.  
Shipping operations in the summer time via the NSR may already today be profitable for minor bulk trades. 
Additional shipping routes may give more flexibility, and the NSR route choice option may facilitate supply 
chain agility and adaptability. Halvor Schøyen, Bråthen (2010) 
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is the shipping route along the coast of Siberia, running from west of the 
Kola Peninsula through the Bering Strait in the east. The present predominant shipping routes between 
Europe and Far East are via the Suez Canal and Cape of Good Hope (South of Africa).  
The five possible routes choices between North West Europe and the Far East and the approximate 
transport distances are given in The Asia to Europe trade are today dependent on the shipping route via 
Suez.  
The present alternative to Suez is via Cape of Good Hope, more than double the distance compared to NSR. 
the uncertainty and the risk connected to the NRS are, among other factors, due to limited accident 
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preparedness as a ship in distress might have difficulties in receiving assistance from rescue teams and ice-
breakers within a short time, and vessel repair facilities may be located thousands of kilometers away 
(Ragner, 2000b). 
5.2.6 Tramp and liner trade                                                                                                                      
The maritime transport routes and their impact on supply chain management Stopford (2009) identifies 
parcel size, price, speed, reliability and security as factors for product differentiation in shipping all of 
which, we claim, are linked to route choice.  
There are two categories of services in shipping: tramp and liner trade (Ragner, 2000a). In a commercial 
and logistics perspective, liner-shipping business is very different from bulk shipping with respect to service 
attributes.  
The supply chain uncertainty and risk categories, Knemeyer et al. (2009) claim that at present there is less 
‘‘slack’’ available in supply chains to deal with catastrophic events. The broad range and widespread nature 
of environmental and behavioral uncertainties for both the NSR and Suez routes makes the risk issue 
complex.  
For NSR, ice-season variations and future Russian policy to NSR infrastructure developments and foreign 
vessel transits currently appear as decisive uncertainties. 
5.3 The tanker got stuck.                                                                                                                                               
Environmental circles evoke the growing concern that so many ships now sailing in the environmentally 
sensitive area. The worst-case scenario is that an oil tanker hit an iceberg or an ice floe. 
 The tanker 'Nordvik' hit an ice floe on the Northeast Passage in autumn 2013 in the Arctic Kara Sea north 
of Russia. The ice drilled a hole in the ship, but was not in danger of sinking. The tanker, according to the 
Barents Observer did not leak oil waited more than a week that a Russian icebreaker arrived and provided 
assistance. 
According Atle Staalesen, an adviser at the Norwegian Barents Secretariat is the 'mighty hard "to get 
information from the Russians on what happens on the Northeast Passage. Therefore, it is uncertain how 
many commercial ships that now sail through the Northeast Passage. 
Resource: POLITIKEN.dk; and Norwegian news Barents Observer. 
5.3.1 The IMO Polar Code                                                                                                                                    
IMO Maritime Safety Committee has decided to provide the Assembly with a proposal for Guidelines for 
ships operating in polar waters. 
The regulatory framework (IMO) 
Provides the mandatory level environmental protection with zero discharge requirements for the Arctic.  
 Newly adopted guidance and recommendations for training and competency of officers and 
masters on ships in Polar Regions.  
 Safety requirements apply to all ships, which are subject to the Convention and operating in Polar 
Regions.  
 Legal framework governing the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of ocean space.  
Source: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL POLAR CODE AGM RINA London Branch 25 April 2013 (IMO 
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5.4. The control over the Arctic route                                                                                                                                   
Li Zhenfu from Dalian University, along with other specialists that deal with the topic, and claims: ”Whoever 
the control over the Arctic route, will control the new passage of the world economics and international 
strategies” (Jakobsen, 2010:6)! 
When the Arctic Council influence increases, each individual state's influence evenly through the political 
consensus structure will increase. The traveler superpower China and the Nordic countries that would 
otherwise struggle to be noticed by just China. There can be no question of a special Arctic – based on 
foreign affairs, all member states are favored (Jakobson 2010, 13). If this feature of the contract gains seen 
as the most important, the agreement livelihood also is explained by a neorealist’s perspective. 
It is clear that maritime traffic and other activities in the Polar area will face great challenges. A realistic 
view is that these challenges will slow down any immediate development, but they will not imply an 
indefinite postponement of future development in the Polar region.  
 In my opinion, the next step for responsible governments should be to develop the regimes necessary to 
meet the challenges created by increased use of the Polar region. Quite another question is whether the 
interested industries are prepared to cover the substantial investment and cost involved if the new 
opportunities of the Arctic were fully exploited! 
5.4.1 Iceland as a hub. 
This could potentially make Iceland a hub for transport (Strong interest from China) between West 
America/Asia and Europe/East America. Shipping in the northern regions, however, is not without 
challenges, particularly in relation to unpredictable weather conditions. Storms, icebergs and extreme 
temperatures are just some of the circumstances that both equipment and crews must be able to handle. 
This means that shipping in the area is highly demanding in terms of safety.  
One consideration is the vulnerable Arctic environment and another is the fact that an accident in Arctic 
regions may have fatal consequences for the crew since it may take several days for help to reach the 
position. Iceland also has plans to expand port facilities so that they are able to accept an increased service 
level, according to the Icelandic Ambassador Sturla Sigurjònsson, Icelandic Ambassador to Kingdom of 
Denmark. 
5.5 China energy insecurities. 
Redirecting trade through an Arctic sea-lane could greatly alleviate China energy insecurities by allowing 
commercial vessels to avoid the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden and South China Sea as well as such politically 
volatile regions as the Middle East. This would contribute to the resolution of China’s “dilemma,” as that 
narrow choke point would no longer dictate global trade patterns. Diverting oil supplies through the Arctic 
would also reduce Chinese dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, therefore reducing the vulnerability of 
those supplies to a hostile shutdown. 
Arctic sea-lanes could also be tremendous cost savers, as they are much shorter than existing routes. A 
voyage from Rotterdam to Shanghai via the Northern Sea Route, for example, is 22 percent shorter than by 
the current route through the Suez Canal.  
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Navigating the Northwest Passage would cut the Suez distance by 15 percent. In addition to saving time 
and tons of bunker fuel, carriers would also avoid prohibitive vessel regulations, such as size restrictions, 
making Arctic sea-lanes attractive for megaships that are too large to pass through current routes (Joseph 
Spears, 2009). 
With these advantages in mind, President Vladimir Putin of Russia has touted the Northern Sea Route as an 
emerging rival to the Suez and Panama Canals. (Gleb Bryanski 2011).  
Chinese analysts share Putin’s optimism, calculating that China could save a staggering $60–$120 billion per 
year solely by diverting trade through the Northern Sea Route. (Malte Humpert, 2011). Ultimately, aside 
from the economic advantages of Arctic shipping, additional vessels will inevitably be diverted through the 
Arctic in any case, as both the Suez and Panama Canals are already operating at maximum capacity! 
5.6 Russia focuses on the countrys Arctic region                                                                                                                
It will, among other things reflected in the fact that Russia focuses on the country's Arctic region as a future 
growth area following the opening of the Northeast Passage. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said at an 
international Arctic conference in Arkhangelsk in September 2011, that: 
"... according to our plans, we will modernize river transport, automobile routes and railways to make it 
easier to use the passage. In addition, we will build a much better system of communication along the entire 
passage.... In addition, we will rebuild and build new airports along the passage, so the companies that will 
take advantage of the Northeast Passage in the future can really benefit economically from it. We want the 
Northeast Passage to compete with other transport routes in terms of safety, quality and price. ” 
(Greenlandic Broadcasting Corporation) 
Increased demand for infrastructural capacities along the entire route will create an increased growth 
(Jespersen 2009, 204), which will be stimulated by the Arctic Council Search and Rescue cooperation thus 
rise to financial gain. This growth will primarily accrue to the Arctic coastal states, but it is equally clear that 
the non- coastal states will be positively stimulated by the growth of their neighbors. It is also not unlikely 
that secondary transport routes will go through Sweden and Finland, thus stimulating their economy more 
directly. The collaboration has thus, from a neoliberal perspective, livelihood, although cooperation 
generates an economic absolute gain for the member countries. 
6. Conclusions 
6.1 Conclusions.                                                                                                                                             
Conclusions and future research due to uncertainty in schedule reliability on the NSR in the short term, this 
route should first be of viable interest and explored for bulk shipping (tramp), rather than for liner shipping. 
The gains from shipping operations on an ice-free NSR appear to be reduced number of days at sea and 
more than doubling of the vessel fuel efficiency.  
For the corporate players in bulk shipping of relative low value raw materials, cost savings for fuel may 
appear as a driver to explore the NSR for commercial transits, and not necessarily reduced lead-time. 
Summer operations on the NSR may be profitable already today.  
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Environmental demands faced by the maritime shipping industry may emerge as one of the drivers for 
developing the NSR. Increased knowledge about environmental benefits and costs for both the NSR and 
Suez routes will probably be important factors in this respect. It may be difficult to do assessments and 
quantifications of the relevant aspects of supply chain transport risks via both the NSR and Suez.  
Combined with the fact that added shipping alternatives gives more route alternatives and flexibility, the 
NSR option may possibly increase supply chain agility and adaptability. Bulk shipping on the NSR route may 
be a prosperous market segment for niche shipping companies. For innovators, risk takers and first movers 
in ship operations and technology, the NSR appears as a possible market niche and opportunity to gain 
market power.  
How does the organization and the nature of relationships (e.g. outsourcing, JIT and time-based 
distribution) between manufacturing industry and the various bulk shipping segments influence the 
demand for developing the NSR for transits? The outsourcing of transport, combined with the fact that 
energy efficiency elsewhere in the supply chain (especially production) is more influential to the overall 
energy efficiency, might influence the cargo owner’s awareness, knowledge and incentives to target green 
logistics and this should be further explored.  
By using, the Northeast Passage ships can save several thousand miles and several days' sail between the 
major trading centers in the North Atlantic and Northeast Asia, which will reduce transport costs 
significantly (Kao et al., 2011, 835). In 2012, there was bumper traffic on the route; there has been a 
tenfold increase in the number of ships that used the route over the past two years. So is cargo volume 
increased by 53 percent compared to the batch goods transported in 2011 (Maritime Denmark).  
Thus increasingly become viable, the use of commercial transportation through the region become more 
and more used (Kao et al., 2011, 835). It is more likely that the Northeast Passage is going to outperform 
essential parts of the existing trade route via Suez.  Search and Rescue Agreement will theoretically have a 
catalytic effect on this development because shipping will be stimulated by a coordinated search and 
rescue practice. 
It can be expected that the application of the Northeast Passage, as the primary connection between the 
North Atlantic and Northeast Asia, will result in an increased demand for infrastructural capacities along 
the entire route (Eger et al., 2011, 407).  
6.2 The Globalized Arctic.                                                                                                                                                     
However, while regionalism dominated the past, and will need to play a much larger role in the future. 
2013 was the year of the globalized Arctic, although globalization is not total new in the Arctic (Heininen 
and Southcott, 2010). It was the year that the relationship between Asia and the Arctic got Serious, was the 
accession of a number of Asian states (China, India, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) as observers to the 
Arctic Council (Kiruna Declaration, 2013).  
The free trade agreement between China and Iceland, as an adjunct to the AC observer ship, made even 
more acute the impacts of globalization on the Arctic. Asian intentions are not ignoble, but they are global: 
transnational shipping, resource development, and climate change science. 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2014 – Vagn Riis 
Side 21 af 32 
Since the mid-1990s, China’s extensive polar research program has spearheaded its Arctic policy. Under the 
direction of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), the mammoth Ukrainian-built 
icebreaker Xuelong has conducted five Arctic research expeditions since 1999, reaching the geographic 
North Pole for the first time during its fourth expedition, in 2010.  
China’s twelfth five-year plan (2011–15) reflects Chinas ambition, announcing three new Arctic expeditions 
to be conducted before 2015. Moreover, by 2014 China intends to launch the first of a series of new 
icebreakers to join Xuelong, thus enabling the CAA to conduct more frequent polar exploration and 
research missions. When the 1.25-billion-yuan ($198 million), eight-thousand-ton vessel sets sail, China will 
possess icebreakers that are larger than and qualitatively superior to those of the United States and Canada 
(Paul McLeary, 2010).  
 In addition to constructing an icebreaker fleet, the PRC is acquiring various technologies essential to 
exploiting new economic opportunities in the Arctic. China is building ice-strengthened bulk carriers and 
tankers capable of commercial Arctic navigation, as well as planes that can fly in harsh polar weather 
conditions, in order to expand Beijing’s aviation network into the Arctic and assist in emergency rescue 
missions (Wang Qian).  
6.3 The Future                                                                                                                                                                                     
When the Norwegian polar town Tromsø earlier this year hosted the large conference Arct Frontiers (Arctic 
Borders) told both the Chinese and Korean ambassadors to Norway, that they would no longer leave the 
races on the new Arctic shipping lane, for European carriers. The commercial and strategic interests in the 
use of the Arctic for the transportation of goods between Asia and Europe is too large to smaller companies 
will be allowed to have this market to them. 
Year by year, the traffic on the Northeast Passage are growing. According to the American newspaper, Wall 
Street Journal has hundreds of vessels applied for permission to sail to the northern Arctic route this year. 
The actual number of voyages between Europe and Asia via the passage is expected to be significantly 
lower and when the Russian authorities are talking about several hundred permits the Northeast Passage is 
to promote the route. 
When the 19.000 Tonnes Chinese containership `Yong Sheng` arrived in Rotterdam, was written a new 
chapter in the history of an increasingly ice-free Arctic. 
It was the first time a large container vessel sailed from Asia to Europe by the Northeast Passage. 'Yong 
Sheng's' journey from Dalian in China to Rotterdam Netherlands - north of Russia - took only 35 days. Was 
the ship sailed south around Asia via the Suez Canal would journey will have been 14 days 
longer. Therefore, in both time and fuel has the journey been great savings. 
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7. Reply to research question 
7.1 Main question:  
MQ 1: “How do new maritime Sailing/Trading routes in the Arctic region impact global trade?” 
“As the northern route opens, the melting ice will have a significant impact on the transportation of goods 
around the world, and the consequences are manifold”, said Didier Schmitt, a scientific adviser at the 
European Commission/ 31. January 2014 in HORIZON.  
The current Global distribution of transport in the maritime shipping: 
Seaborne Trade Value of World (US dollars) 
52%  Container 
         22%            Tankers 
         20%            General Cargo 
 6%  Dry Bulk 
Source: Lloyd´s Maritime Intelligence (Unit) 
When I look at the current turnover in liner shipping is according to World Shipping Counsil around U.S. $ 
400 trillion a year and none of the sales happening today on the Northern Sea Route (NSR).                                   
 
The more that NSR is free of ice, the more revenue will be redirected to the NSR due to the shorter 
transport time. At the same time, only the annual growth in global demand increase the need for 
transportation. 
 
At the same time, we see that the transport part in a Value Chain Analysis will be upgraded as more 
valuable. 
 
Looking at Off Shoring, it gives you great opportunities to the manufacture and supply of the market you 
actually want to be on, since it is possible to get the supply parts out from other parts of the world, much 
faster than usual. 
 
The shorter travel time will also increase the amount of fresh food to Asia, spec. China. A high wish of the 
Chinese authorities, who want an increased amount of "safe" fresh food. 
‘We must note that it is not climate change that opens shipping lanes or provides access to new resources, 
it is political decisions.’ Didier Schmitt, Scientific Advisor, European Commission, 31. January 2014 in 
HORIZON 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2014 – Vagn Riis 
Side 23 af 32 
So yes, the new maritime trading routes will have an even very large effect on global trade in the future but 
not for the next years! " 
 
 
7.1.1 Reply to sub-questions (to research questions) 
SQ 1: “Who are the principal stakeholders in maritime transportation in the Arctic?  
“States influence in the Arctic!”                                                                                                                                                               
In 1996, the Arctic Council were created by the eight Arctic states: Canada, the United States, Russia, 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Finland. This high-level intergovernmental forum was established 
to ensure coordination and interaction among the Arctic nations on issues such as sustainable development 
and environmental protection. 
 Only states with territory in the Arctic can be members of the Council. However, non-Arctic states now 
have the ability to apply for a so-called ´observer status´. As of May 2013, twelve non-Arctic states have 
obtained this Permanent Observer status. Some of these non-Arctic states, such as China, India and Italy, 
are preparing to exploit a seasonally ice-free Arctic. This complicates the Arctic´s already fragile security 
environment (Rainwater 2012: 62).  
Among these non-Arctic states, China is particularly determined to have a greater influence in Arctic affairs 
(Jakobson & Peng 2012: 1). It has maintained a vast, well-funded Arctic research apparatus since the mid-
1990s and has invested heavily in Arctic-resource projects in recent years (Rainwater, 2012: 63). Under the 
direction of the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), the icebreaker Xuelong has conducted 
five Arctic research expeditions since 1999 (Rainwater 2012: 69). It is evident that China is eager to access 
Arctic resources and shipping opportunities. 
When evaluated in isolation, China´s Arctic engagement appears to have increased significantly. 
Nevertheless, it is important to realize that China´s involvement in the Arctic is merely a reflection of 
China´s activities as a rising major power (Jakobson & Peng, 2012: 20). China´s extraordinary economic 
growth is currently transforming the entire global political arena. Future decades will most probably see 
even greater increases in Chinese power and influence. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to 
China´s general foreign policy agenda while analyzing the country´s interests in the Arctic.   
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The figure provides an overview of the structure of the Arctic Council. 
 
The council is made up of the top three groups of actors, the Arctic countries, the additional, permanent 
stakeholder groups (including representatives of the indigenous peoples) and observers (including both the 
permanent and non-permanent). Further, six working groups will work and support the Council with 
scientific studies. 
Source :( Environmental Protection Agency) 
The Arctic Council (Russia, Canada, USA, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden and Finland) has noted the 
need for development and implementation of suitable national and international regulations and 
underlined the need for mandatory regulations for operations in Arctic waters (the Polar Code), oil spill 
preparedness and SAR (Search and Rescue). Denmark will chair the Arctic Council during the period 2009-
11. The Northern Sea Route and the Russian approach – and Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 2004. 
Russia is committed to establish the Northern Sea Route (NSR) along its Northern coast. It will also allow 
transport corridors to be established outside the Russian territorial waters, implying that there would be no 
control, no fees and no shallow waters. This would however also imply that there would be limited 
monitoring and rescue preparedness, few people close to you and, consequently, a long response time in 
case of incidents or accidents.  
The first shipments from the Russian fields and the transshipments at Varanday started in 2008. So far, no 
particular problems have been experienced, probably because of the strict requirements to the ships used 
imposed by the Russian Government and the sellers and buyers of the oil.  
The states involved have their respective responsibilities, and effective bilateral cooperation has proved to 
be of great value. The cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Transport and the Norwegian Ministry 
of Fisheries and Coastal affairs covers both safety at sea and oil spill preparedness. 
However, I do think that the totally Global World are the principal stakeholders in maritime transportation 
in the Arctic! 
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7.1.2 Reply to sub-questions (to research questions) 
Which maritime activities have been taking place on the Northern Sea Route, by whom and what is their 
motivation? 
RSQ 2: I have chosen to focus on players who have left their mark on or influenced developments in one 
way or another! Two countries Russia and China.                                                                                                                                                         
- Russia is one of the original participating countries in the Arctic Council and                                                                  
- China as one of the observer countries. 
Russia:                                                                                                                                                                                
The 2001 “Russian Maritime Doctrine 2020” (Security Council of the Russian Federation 2001) stressed four 
domains of prospective Arctic policies: free access to the Atlantic for all Russian vessels, access to offshore 
natural resources, mainly oil and gas, the strategic importance of the Russian fleet for reasons of national 
security and the economic importance of the Northern Sea Route for sustainable economic development. 
 While such policy goals have been demonized as unveiling the Kremlin’s ambitions to extend its hegemonic 
position in the entire Arctic, the document clearly referred to all areas within the Russian exclusive 
economic zone that are already under state sovereignty anyway. Russia’s focus on its northern territories 
as a domain of energy development is, hence, hardly different from what other Arctic strategies expose. In 
2008, President Medvedev, who just took office from Vladimir Putin, approved a detailed Arctic policy 
disclosed in the “Guidelines of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic Until 2020 and beyond”. ‘ 
 
The paper names four policy priorities: 
1. Using the Russian Federation’s Arctic Zone as a strategic resource base, 
2. Safeguarding the region as a zone of peace and cooperation,  
3. Protecting the Arctic’s ecosystem and  
4. Using the Northern Sea Route for transport and communication. 
Russia’s Northern Policy. A comprehensive Development Strategy for the Russian Arctic up to 2020 has been 
approved by President Vladimir Putin on 20 February 2013. 
(See: Sebastian Knecht & Kathrin Keil (2013) Arctic geopolitics revisited: spatialising governance in the 
circumpolar North, The Polar Journal, 3:1, 195, DOI: 10.1080/2154896X.2013.783276) 
China:                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
The overriding motives behind China’s desire to understand the implications of a melting Arctic and 
strengthen its influence in Arctic affairs are economic, how China can benefit from new economic 
opportunities offered by the warming Arctic and how a warming Arctic will adversely affect China’s 
economy are the government’s most important concerns. Chinese officials and scholars recognize that in 
the next decades the Arctic will offer opportunities for many shipping-related industries, fishing and the 
resources sector. As for the adverse effects, Chinese scientists want to understand how changes to China’s 
climate caused by the melting Arctic sea ice will affect agriculture—in other words, food security. For 
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example, changes in the Arctic climate are believed to pose direct flood threats to Chinese coastal cities. 
According to Ma Deyi, the chief scientist on China’s fifth Arctic expedition in 2012.  
To strengthen the capabilities of Chinese scientists, the Chinese Government has encouraged international 
Arctic-related scientific cooperation. China has invited foreign scientists to participate in all five of its Arctic 
expeditions. In 2012, for example, scientists from France, Iceland, Taiwan and the United States were on 
board Xuelong.  (Qu, J. and Zhang, X.). Since 1996 China has been a member of the Inter- national Arctic 
Science Committee (IASC), a non-governmental organization that aims to facilitate multidisciplinary 
research on the Arctic region. 
(See: Jakobson, Linda & Peng, Jingchao (2012) China´s Arctic Aspirations. SIPRI Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute. Policy Paper 34 chapter 3 Page 1 (Motives behind China’s Activities)) 
8. Further Analysis and activity 
8.1 The need for further analysis or other activity may: 
1. Future research, due to uncertainty in schedule reliability on the NSR in the short term, this route 
should first be of viable interest and explored for bulk shipping (tramp), rather than for liner 
shipping. 
2. I suggest that future research in a supply chain management and JTI (Just in Time) management 
context should be carried out along the following lines. 
3. In my opinion, the next step for responsible governments should be to develop the regimes 
necessary to meet the challenges created by increased use of the Polar region. Quite another 
question is whether the interested industries are prepared to cover the substantial investment and 
cost involved if the new opportunities of the Arctic were fully exploited. 
4. The biggest obstacle is Russia and its bureaucracy, up to 9 months of planning to carry out sailing. 
This question should, perhaps, be made to President Vladimir Putin, that they (he) could achieve 
the goal of NSR as a perfect sailing route! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2014 – Vagn Riis 
Side 27 af 32 
Bibliography: 
Angel, D. P., et al. (2007) Global Environmental Standards for Industry. In: Annual Review of Environment 
and Resources 32(1): 295-316.  
Arie Kacowicz, Globalization, Poverty, and the North-South Divide Globalization, Poverty, and the North-
South Divide(pp. 565-580)  Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4621860 
Aronsson, H., Brodin, M.H., Kohn, C., 2008. Logistics Structures – Drivers of environmental Impact. 
Copenhagen Business School Press (Northern Lights in Logistics and Supply Chain Management). 
Arctic Year Book 2013, Preface: “The Arctic House Rules – Ólafur Ragnar Grimsson, President of Iceland” 
page 22-23 a.o. 
Atle Staalesen, an adviser at the Norwegian Barents Secretariat 
Atlant 
Det norske nyhedsbureau Barents Observer. 
Gleb Bryanski, “Russia’s Putin Says Arctic Trade Route to Rival Suez,” Reuters, 22 September 2011, 
ca.reuters.com/. 
Callinicos, Alex (2007) Does Capitalism Need the State System? In: Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 20(4): 533-549 
Chen, Gang (2012) China’s Emerging Arctic strategy. In: The Polar Journal 2(2): 358-371 
Christensen, S.A., 2009. Are the Northern Sea Routes Really the Shortest? Maybe a Too Rose-colored 
Picture of the Blue Arctic Ocean. Danish Institute for International Studies [internet]. 
<http://www.diis.dk/sw74533.asp  
Corbett, James J. and Winebrake, James (2008) the Impacts of Globalization on International Maritime 
Transport Activity. Contribution to the OECD Global Forum on Transport and Environment in a Globalizing 
World. (Digitally available: http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/greening-transport/41380820.pdf) 
DI´s Global benchmark report, 2013 – Arctic Shipping Routes a.o. 
The Economist´s special report in the Arctic, 2012 
Eger et. Al., 201, 407 
Environmental Protection Agency, 21/11-2012 
Gereffi et. al. (2001) Introduction: Globalization, Value chains and Development. In: IDS Bulletin 32(3): 1-8 
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) Trading Down: Africa, Value Chains and the Global Economy. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2014 – Vagn Riis 
Side 28 af 32 
Government of the Russian Federation, Guidelines. The original text of the document is only available in 
Russian. A reliable English translation can be found here: http://icr.arcticpor- 
tal.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1791%3 Afoundations-of-the-rus- sian-
federations-state-policy-in-the-arctic-until-2020-and-beyond&catid=45%3 Anews-2007& 
Itemid=111&lang=sa.  
Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, President of Iceland, “The Arctic House Rules “ The Arctic yearbook 2013                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Greenland Broadcasting Corporation: 
 http://www.knr.gl/da & http://www.knr.gl/da/nyheder/rusland-vil-gøre-nordøstpassagen-mere-
attraktiv  Vladimir Putin on conference in Arkhangelsk September 2011. 
 
Heininen, Lassi and Chris Southcott (Eds.)  (2010) “Globalization and the Circumpolar North”. Anchorage: 
University of Alaska Press. 
Hopkins, T. K. and Wallerstein, I. (1986) Commodity Chains in the World Economy prior to 1800. In: Review 
10: 157-170 
Ma Deyi, Bandao Dushi Bao, 3 July 2012. Ma Deyi is the director of the No. 1 Ocean Research Institute, 
research institute for marine sciences and oceanology. 
Malte Humpert, “Part 5: The Future of the Northern Sea Route—a ‘Golden Waterway’ or a Niche Trade 
Route,” Arctic Institute Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, 3 October2011. 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) How does insertion in global value chains affect upgrading in industrial 
clusters?  pages 1017-1027 
IMO - PROGRESS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL POLAR CODE AGM RINA London 
Branch 25 April 2013  
Jakobson, Linda & Peng, Jingchao (2012) China´s Arctic Aspirations. Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute. Policy Paper 34 chapter 3 (Motives behind China’s Activities) 
Jakobson, Linda (2010) ”China prepares for an ice-free Arctic” - SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 
2010/2  
Kao et al., 2011, 835 
Kaplinsky (2005) Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Kiruna Declaration (2013). Arctic Council Secretariat: Kiruna Declaration. Kiruna, Sweden, 15 May 2013. 
Knecht, Sebastian & Keil, Kathrin (2013) Arctic Geopolitics Revisited: Spatialising Governance in the 
Circumpolar North. In: The Polar Journal 3(1): 195, DOI: 10.1080/2154896X.2013.783276 
Knemeyer et al. (2009 Proactive planning for catastrophic event in supply chains. Journal of Operations 
Management 27 (2), 141-153. 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2014 – Vagn Riis 
Side 29 af 32 
Kvale and Brinkmann 2008, 167 
Levy, David L. (2005) Offshoring in the New Global Political Economy. In: Journal of Management Studies 
42(3): 685-693 
Liu, M., Kronbak, J., 2009. The potential economic viability of using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as an 
alternative route between Asia and Europe. Journal of Transport Geography. 
Paul McLeary, “The Arctic: China Opens a New Strategic Front,” World Politics Review, 19 May 2010.  
Maritime Denmark –  http://www.maritimedanmark.dk/?Id=16652. September 2011  
National Snow & Ice Data Center 
Qu, J. and Zhang, X., Xinhua, 2 July 2012, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-
07/02/c_112336620.htm  
Qu et al. (note 7), p. 368.   
The Polar Journal 2013: 195. Downloaded by [Roskilde Universitetsbibliotek] at 03:24 21 October 2013 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2013.783276 
http://politiken.dk/oekonomi/virksomheder/ECE2074530/kinesisk-containerskib-erobrer-nyarktisk-
sejlrute/ POLITIKEN.dk; 
Rainwater, Shiloh (2012) Race to the North: China´s Arctic Strategy and its Implications. In: Naval War 
College Review 66(2): 62-82 
Ragner, C.L., 2000a. The 21st Century—Turning Point for the Northern Sea Route. 
Ragner, C.L., 2000b. Northern Sea Route Cargo Flows and Infrastructure – Present 
Rodrigue, J., Comtois, C., Slack, B., 2006. The Geography of Transport Systems. Rutledge. 
Rodrigues, J., 2008. The rapid decline of the sea ice in the Russian Arctic. Cold Regions Science and 
Technology 54 (2), 124–142. 
Russia’s Northern Policy. A comprehensive Development Strategy for the Russian Arctic up to 2020 approved 
by President Vladimir Putin on 20 February 2013 and can be accessed here: 
http://www.government.ru/docs/22846/ . 
Icelandic Ambassador Sturla Sigurjònsson, Icelandic Ambassador til Kingdom of Denmark 
Schøyen, H., Bråthen, S., 2010. Bulk Shipping via the Northern Sea Route versus via The Suez Canal: Who 
will gain from a shorter transport route? In: Proceedings of The 12th World Conference on Transport 
Research, 11–15 July, 2010, Lisbon, Portugal. 
Security Council of the Russian Federation, The Maritime Doctrine 
Stilwell, Frank (2006) Political Economy: The Contest of Economic Ideas. Oxford University Press 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2014 – Vagn Riis 
Side 30 af 32 
Stopford, M., 2009. Maritime Economics, third ed. Routledge. 
Joseph Spears, “China and the Arctic: The Awakening Snow Dragon,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 9, 
no. 6 (March 2009), p. 11. 
US Geological Survey 2008:  http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf 
 
Verny, J., Grigentin, C., 2009. Container shipping on the Northern Sea Route. International Journal of 
Production Economics 122 (1), 107-119 
Wallenstein, I. (1987, October 22). Development: Lodestar or Illusion? A Talk at Distinguished Speaker 
Series. Center for Advanced Study of International Development, Michigan State University, pp. 7–8. 
Wang Qian, “New Icebreaker to Improve China’s Polar Research.” “$1b Jumbo Deepwater Rig Delivered to 
CNOO C,” China Daily, 23 May 2011, www.chinadaily.com.cn/. 
Wikipedia - http://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fil:Northern_Sea_Route_vs_Southern_Sea_Route.svg,   
 
Wilhelmsen, W., 2007. Homepage Wilh. Wilhelmsen Group. Environmental Report 2007 [internet]. 
http://www.wilhelmsen.com/about/CorpSocResp/Enviroment/document/Enviromental%20report
.pdf 
 
Wergeland, Tor – Author to the book “Shipping in Arctic Waters”                                                                                                                                          
former CBS – now Consultant with own company . 
Østreng, Willy (2011) ”The Changing Geopolitics of the Arctic” - Mercator vol. 4, pp. 392-395  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GPE - Global Political Economy – February 2014 – Vagn Riis 
Side 31 af 32 
Appendix 1 -  
The questions listed in the table are for the interview with Tor Wergeland on the 20th of November. On the 
left, first column is the question asked to Tor Wergeland in the middle column is the follow up question 
need to get the answer we are looking to acquire and in the third column is the explanation for what we 
seek with the individual question. The third column is aimed at helping the interviewer to stay on course 
and insure the interview becomes constructive. 
Question Sub-Questions (focus) Purpose 
Introduction of us and our 
project. 
  
Who are you?  What is your research 
background? 
Brief introduction to your work on 
the Arctic? 
Open the conversation with Tor 
Wergeland. 
What are the main developments 
in the Arctic? 
Who is active? 
What has changed in recent time?  
What possibilities do you see in 
the Arctic? 
Is it all positive? 
To get a snapshot of the Arctic as 
of today 
How are the maritime shipping 
routes in the Arctic being used? 
(show the map) 
Who are using the routes? 
Is there is equal access to the 
routes? 
Which companies are active now? 
Overview of the current 
economic scene in the arctic 
What are the gains by shifting to 
the Arctic shipping routes? (e.g. 
compared to the Suez canal, 
Panama canal or Strait of 
Malacca) 
Who gains? (Shipping companies, 
producers or consumers?) 
Are there certain regions, cities or 
locations that benefit more than 
others? 
We know it is shorter to go north 
and this saves fuel. But are there 
other benefits? 
This can quickly lead to 
speculation about the future. 
However, it is important to 
understand the reasons behind 
moving into the Arctic. 
Who are preparing to take 
advantage of the shipping routes? 
Which countries and cities? 
Any companies changing their 
This is about which actors are 
preparing at the moment. Not 
who can benefit on the long run.  
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fleet? 
What is/will is shipped through 
the Arctic? 
What part do shipping routes 
account for in global trade? 
Does change in cost of shipping 
directly affect export possibilities? 
How can value chains or 
production networks be affected 
by the new shipping routes? 
To get a perspective on shipping 
in global trade. Important both 
for our theory and integration 
with the course. Further it helps 
explaining the interest of these 
new routes. 
Which Danish actors are present 
(with regards to the shipping 
routes)? 
Any shipping companies actively 
using the opportunities as of now? 
How are Danish organisations 
promoting the Arctic routes e.g. 
Confederation of Danish industry 
and Confederation of Danish ship 
owners? 
For the future of this research an 
additional information on our 
conference with Confederation of 
Danish ship owners and the 
reports we have and the 
interview we also are planning 
Specific about the company 
Nordic Bulk Carriers, do you know 
about their activities using the 
arctic shipping routes? 
Were they the first company to 
use the North-eastern route? 
How big a share of total Arctic 
shipping?  
For our (hopefully) future 
interview with NBC it would be 
interesting to see how well 
known the activities of NBC is 
What uncertainties does shipping 
companies encounter in the 
Arctic? 
Political? 
Economic? 
Environmental? 
How does the cost of this risk 
affect the interest for shipping 
companies? 
The fragile environment of the 
Arctic can easily be affected by 
commercial interest; hence 
economic cost can be applied to 
companies venturing into the 
Arctic. 
 
 
 
 
 
